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This paper explores the relationship between the acquired proportions of equity, Chinese 
multinational enterprises’ choice and various institutional distances namely, the government 
and the judicial system distance, economic distance and management distance. This paper 
uses 554 cases of Chinese companies' cross-border acquisitions from 2010-2019.These cases 
were collected by Zephyr database. This paper concludes that when Chinese companies enter 
an unfamiliar market, as the government and the judicial system difference expands, the 
Chinese companies choose to acquire a higher proportion of the targets; However, as the 
difference in economic system expands, Chinese multinational companies reduce the 
proportion of equity; The management distance effect for Chinese companies' cross-border 
acquisitions on share ownership is not obvious. 
 




Table of Contents 
List of Tables ............................................................................................................................. v 
1.Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development ..................................................................... 4 
2.1 Formal institutional distance and ownership .................................................................... 4 
2.1.1 Government distance and ownership ......................................................................... 4 
2.1.2 Economic distance and ownership ............................................................................ 6 
2.2 Informal institutional distance and ownership ................................................................. 7 
2.2.1 Management distance and ownership ........................................................................ 7 
3. Methodology: ......................................................................................................................... 8 
3.1 Sample description and data ............................................................................................. 9 
3.2 Variables......................................................................................................................... 11 
3.2.1 Dependent variable .................................................................................................. 11 
3.2.2 Independent variables .............................................................................................. 11 
3.2.3 Control variables...................................................................................................... 13 
4. Results and Analysis ............................................................................................................ 14 
4.1Description and Correlation analysis .............................................................................. 14 
4.2 Regression results analysis ............................................................................................. 16 
5. Discussion and conclusions ................................................................................................. 18 
References ................................................................................................................................ 25 




List of Tables 
Table 1-Number of Firms by Year ............................................................................................. 9 
Table 2-Number of Firms by Industry ..................................................................................... 10 
Table 3-Number of Firms by Continent ................................................................................... 10 
Table 4-Variable Definition ...................................................................................................... 14 
Table 5-Descriptive Statistics .................................................................................................. 15 
Table 6-Correlations ................................................................................................................. 16 
Table 7-Regression Analysis (Independent variables are government distance, economic 
distance and management distance). ........................................................................................ 16 
Table 8-Regression Analysis (Independent variables is management distance) ...................... 17 
Table 9-Frequencies of the Top 10 Countries .......................................................................... 25 
Table 10-Standard errors clustered by years ............................................................................ 26 




Since 2008, the number of cross-border acquisitions by Chinese companies has increased 
sharply. For Chinese companies, cross-border acquisition is an inevitable approach to break 
the domestic development bottleneck and exploit new markets. If Chinese multinational 
companies want to open the door of foreign markets through mergers and acquisitions, then 
top priority for Chinese companies should be equity ownership. The ownership structure 
decision is whether to choose a low ownership level to defend against any uncertain factors in 
foreign market or to choose a high ownership level to make sure a strong control for 
subsequent integration. It is necessary to acquire a higher stake if the acquirer plans to obtain 
the decision-making right and have influence on business’ operational processes, which 
ensures that the acquirer could meet the strategic objectives (Anderson and Gatignon (1986)). 
To achieve higher performance by reconfiguring the target firm, acquirers tend to choose 
acquisition of higher equity stake (Fowler and Schmidt (1989)). However, there is also an 
implied risk when firms decide to choose higher share ownership. When Chinese companies 
enter unfamiliar markets, lower stake ownership could help them mitigate the uncertainties 
and operational risks (Delos and Beamish (2001)). 
As defined by many previous studies, institutions were created for social trading system 
which regulates the interaction between members in society (North (1991)). An institution 
can be divided into the following three pillars: regulative pillar, normative pillar and 
cognitive pillar (Scott (1995)). In neo-institutional theory, the regulative pillar refers to the 
certain actors' capacity, by virtue of their authority, to constrain the behavior of other actors in 
an institutional field (Caronna (2004)). Regulative pillar is controlled by government and the 
judicial system, which is also referred to as the formal institution. Normative pillar is the 
legal way for social members to pursue higher value. Cognitive pillar is related to social 
belief and common sense (Pan (2008)). Normative and cognitive pillars are combined into 
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informal institution. Some existing studies focus on the relationship between formal 
institutional differences (“distance”), between home and host nations, and capital structure. 
The reasons why institutional distance has an impact on equity ownership has been 
investigated before but the conclusions for the relationship are not consistent. Moreover, 
there are only a few studies that focus on Chinese multinational’s cross-border cases. 
Currently, the mainstream theory is based on acquirers from developed economies. The 
Monopoly Advantage theory (Hymer (1960)), suggests that when acquirers enter host 
country, they face an effect, “liability of foreignness”, after the completion of mergers. 
Compared with local enterprises, multinational companies must have ownership advantages 
to make up for the disadvantages of being outsiders (Hymer (1960)). Because of the liability 
of foreignness, acquirers lack enough experience on business model in host country market, 
and they may be subjected to differential treatment compared with local companies (Zaheer 
(1995)). However, the higher institutional distance (including formal institutional distance 
and informal institutional distance) also increases the incidences of higher cost of legal fees 
and contract fees between acquirers and targets. This results in a high likelihood that 
multinational companies will choose to make solo investment rather than a joint venture 
(Estrin et al. (2009)). Correspondingly, if this is not the first-time the acquirer is entering a 
host country, then institutional distance will not have a significant relationship with the 
equity ownership stake (Estrin et al. (2009)). Existing studies on the Chinese acquirers 
find that with larger institutional distance (including formal institutional distance and the 
informal one), Chinese companies tend to choose joint venture ownership (Chen and Fan 
(2014)). Specifically, with the greater formal institutional distance, Chinese multinational 
companies tend to choose majority acquisition rather than minority acquisition, and with 
the greater informal institutional distance, Chinese multinational companies tend to 
choose minority acquisition rather than majority acquisition (Sui (2015)). However, 
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because previous studies make no distinction between Greenfield Investment (In 
economics, a greenfield investment (GI) refers to a type of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) where a company establishes operations in a foreign country. In a greenfield 
investment, the company constructs new facilities cross-border from the ground up 
(Corporate Finance Institute)) and mergers and acquisitions, the impact of institutional 
distance on the choice of equity ownership choice has not been fully explored. 
In case of cross-border acquisitions, the flexibility of ownership choices is low due to the 
unfamiliarity of the target market and the integration process. In recent years, studies  have 
shown that there exists a U-shape relationship between culture distance and ownership 
choices (Malhotra (2011));Formal institutional distance is positively related to ownership 
choice corresponding to a negative relationship between informal institutional distance 
and ownership choice (Contractor et al. (2014)); When entering a target country with a 
higher institutional distance, acquirers tend to choose partial acquisitions rather than full 
acquisitions (Elango (2013)); Furthermore, the ownership strategies adopted by 
developing countries in cross-border mergers and acquisitions are different from those by 
developed countries (Lahiri et al. (2014)). In conclusion, there exist only a few studies 
that investigate the cross border merger and acquisition decisions especially those of the 
multinationals from emerging economies (Contractor et al. (2014); (Beule et al. (2014)). 
This thesis focuses on the impact of formal institutional distance and informal distance on 
Chinese companies’ equity strategy in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. This paper 
collects 554 transactions from Europe, Asia, North America, Oceania, South Africa and 
Africa from 2010 to 2019. This paper uses Euclidean distance to calculate institutional 
distance and tests different hypotheses using linear regression to examine the relationship 
between share ownership and formal institutional distance and informal institutional distance. 
This paper reaches the following conclusions: With higher government institutional distance, 
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Chinese acquirers like to choose higher share ownership. With higher economic distance, 
Chinese acquirers like to choose lower share ownership.  And with higher management 
distance, Chinese acquirers like to choose higher share ownership. However, this relationship 
shows is not robust across all specifications.  
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 Formal institutional distance and ownership  
Institutional theory suggests that multinational companies need to consider institutional 
environment in the host country and need to analyze different pillars of institutional 
environment in order to succeed post-acquisitions (Dikova et al. (2009)). Institutional 
distance can be divided into formal institutional distance and informal institutional distance 
(Gaur and Lu (2007)). Formal institutional distance is related to rules, laws and government 
practices difference (Contractor (2014)). This paper divides formal institutional distance 
specifically into government and judicial system institutional distance which is related to the 
freedom and power of government and economic distance which is related to economic 
activity regulations. 
2.1.1 Government distance and ownership 
Government institutional distance can be referred to the difference in the broad environment 
between the acquirer’s country and its target country (Dikova et al (2009)). For acquirers, 
government institutional distance will create positive effect on the success of acquisitions, 
which is supported by institution arbitrage theory. On the other hand, according to liability of 
foreignness, government distance will also create a negative effect. 
From the prospective of the institution arbitrage theory, because of the unsystematic and 
unsound government policies in developing countries, the operational cost is larger for 
developing country acquirers doing business in home country than in the host country (Witt 
and Lewin (2007)). To avoid unsound government and judicial policies and get benefits from 
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the developed country’s market, acquirers from developing countries can choose 
multinational operating model from early business stage. As the distance between home 
country and host country increases, the differences between the domestic resources available 
to multinational companies and the resources available in the host country increase as well, 
which means that multinational companies can use these heterogeneities to gain benefits 
(Gaur and Lu (2007)). According to policy arbitrage theory, government institutional distance 
may create benefits for developing acquirers and therefore acquirers choose to acquire higher 
proportion of shares. Furthermore, it is easier to identify government institutional distance 
rather than economic distance and informal institutional distance because law and judicial 
regulations are explicit and clear. Multinational companies can obtain government and 
judicial system differences easily. As a result, acquirers could choose to increase proportion 
of shares acquired. 
However, according to liability of foreignness theory, a greater government distance 
represents a lack of familiarity about local institutional environment, which will increase the 
difficulty to establish a business. In other words, liability of foreignness leads to an 
uncertainty about the legitimacy of starting a business (Kostova and Zaheer (1999)). 
Therefore, a high government institutional distance will increase the difficulty of cross-border 
management, so acquirers will choose a low shareholding structure when they enter an 
unfamiliar market. They tend to choose joint venture rather than sole proprietorship 
(Anderson and Gatignon (1986)). 
Therefore, we need to determine whether liability of foreignness theory dominates for 
Chinese cross-border merger and acquisition or policy arbitrage theory dominates. According 
to empirical research studies, the adverse effects of China’s foreigner disadvantages in cross-
border mergers and acquisitions are far less than the the benefits of institutional arbitrage, 
which echoes the Chinese government’s call for enterprises to “go global”. Chinese 
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companies are increasingly inclined to strategically “leave” the local market and move to the 
international market (Boisot and Meyer (2008)). Thus, this paper posits the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the government institutional distance between the Chinese acquirer 
and the target company, the greater the share of ownership the Chinese companies involved 
in cross-border mergers & acquisitions will choose. 
2.1.2 Economic distance and ownership 
The difference in economic development between home country and host country has been 
defined as “economic distance”, usually related to financial strength, economic size, factor 
cost, infrastructure and technical level (Bai et al. (2014)). Based on previous research studies, 
many scholars have paid more attention to cultural differences’ impact on the merger and 
acquisition strategy and the follow-up performance (Luo and Peng (1999); Barkema (1996)). 
However, with the process of economic globalization, the cultural differences between 
countries are decreasing, and there is also an interesting phenomenon that two similar culture 
countries（such as China and Singapore）have completely different government systems 
and judicial procedures (Pan (2008)). As result, scholars tend to focus on explicit 
determinants, such as economic differences. With the development of economic 
globalization, economic distance has gradually become an essential determinant related to 
foreign investment and the performance of this investment (Tsang and Yip (2007)). Although 
some scholars believe that with the higher economic distance between the nations of acquirer 
company and target company, the survival rate of multinational companies is higher (Bai et 
al. (2014)), most research studies find that with the greater economic distance between two 
nations, there is  a higher  possibility for multinational companies to fail in their foreign 
business operations. With a higher economic distance, there is less intra-industry trade and 
based on many empirical studies, there exists a negative relationship between economic 
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distance and trade (Martínez-Zarzoso and Nowak-Lehmann (2004)). Therefore, with the 
greater economic distance between the two countries, the success rate of cross-border 
acquisitions is lower (Tsang and Yip (2007)). This paper proposes the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: If the economic distance between a Chinese acquirer and the target company is 
high, the Chinese cross-border acquirer will choose a lower level of ownership in the target 
firm. 
2.2 Informal institutional distance and ownership 
Unlike formal distance, informal institutional distance is implicit, which is hard for acquirers 
to  measure. This indicates that with higher informal institutional distance, the liability of 
foreignness is larger (Kostova & Zaheer (1999)). This paper focuses on the informal distance 
related to business management. So, this paper will only explore the relationship between 
share ownership and management institutional distance. This paper also investigates whether 
there exists a policy arbitrage or not?  
2.2.1 Management distance and ownership 
The management distance between the two countries of acquirer and target is in normative 
institutional pillar, which is difficult for foreign companies to measure precisely. Therefore, 
the greater the distance of the normative system, the stronger liability of foreignness 
(Kostova & Zaheer (1999)). From the perspective of management level, the greater 
management distance may cause the acquirer to be unfamiliar with the foreign business 
model, and thus cannot apply the domestic business model to the foreign market. The 
management distance mainly includes differences in corporate culture (Nadolska and 
Barkeman (2007)), management methods, and performance evaluation systems (Datta 
(1991)). Datta (1991) empirically analyzes the M&A performance of 173 US companies 
based on the differences between management methods and performance evaluation systems. 
It is found that regardless of the level of integration, with the larger differences in 
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management methods between the nations of acquirer and target, there is a high possibility of 
a poor M&A performance. This shows that corporate differences are an important factor 
influencing M&A performance. 
A few studies indicate that knowledge transfer and integration after mergers and acquisitions 
is the key to improving M&A performance (Slangen (2006); Bjorkman et al. (2007); Reus 
and Lamont (2009)). Differences between companies can hinder communication, reduce 
cooperation, and increase the difficulty of knowledge transfer (Li and Scullion (2006)). In 
addition, differences in management practices, culture, and performance assessments can 
exacerbate the conflicts between acquirers and targets, resulting in brain drain and reduced 
M&A performance (Krug and Nigh (1998)). 
Compared with multinational mergers and acquisitions of developed countries, the goal of 
Chinese companies' cross-border M&A is usually to enhance their technological and 
innovation capabilities by acquiring strategic resources (Wu (2007); Mingxia (2009)). 
Strategic resources are often embedded in individuals in the organization (It is contained in 
the daily production and operation of the enterprise and cannot be quantified by numbers or 
ratios). Due to the different types of knowledge acquired, the difficulty, direction and 
incentive mechanism of knowledge transfer are different, and tacit knowledge is often more 
difficult to transfer than explicit knowledge. Therefore, Chinese companies face the challenge 
of acquiring tacit knowledge through reverse knowledge transfer. This puts higher demands 
on the knowledge transfer and integration capabilities of less experienced Chinese 
companies. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the management distance between the nations of the acquirer and 
the target company, the lower the share ownership the Chinese acquirer involved in a cross-




3.1 Sample description and data 
The sample for this paper is from the global acquisition transaction analysis library Zephyr. 
Zephyr is a database providing comprehensive merger & acquisition data. It currently 
contains more than 500,000 M&A transactions in various industries around the world and 
extensively covers Chinese transactions data. This paper selects the China’s cross-border 
acquisition data during 2010-2019. This period is also a period of rapid economic 
development in China and increasing number of Chinese companies have chosen to expand 
outward. Moreover, Chinese government is also encouraging companies to go global, thereby 
expanding China’s economic influence in the world. In order to ensure the availability of 
empirical variables and the accuracy of the research results, this study ensures: (a) the 
acquisition transaction is completed, and is not a duplicate transaction; (2) the acquirer is the 
enterprise entity rather than individual, and the name of the acquiring company can be 
obtained instead of “undisclosed”; (3) the proportion of shares acquired  is publicly available, 
not “unknown”; (4) The acquired companies are not Chinese enterprises, and their parent 
companies are also not from China. 
According to the above criteria, this paper uses 554 transactions as a sample. The sample 
description table as is following:  
Table 1. 
This table classifies the sample by years. 
Number of Firms by Year  
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Total 
Number 19 51 40 42 66 67 114 74 61 20 554 
 
 
Table 2.  
This table classifies the sample by industries. 
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Table 3.  
This table classifies the sample by continents. 
Number of Firms by Continent 
Continent Number of Firms 
Europe 336 
Asia 19 
North America 117 
Oceania 50 




Table 1 shows that from 2010 to 2019, Chinese acquirers completed 554 M&A transactions. 
Year 2016 is the blowout year for China's mergers and acquisitions. The reason for this may 
be that China’s economic growth rate became the highest in the world in 2016. From Table 2, 
we could see that the mergers and acquisitions activity is concentrated in the manufacturing 
industry. In Table 3, this provides geographic location of these deals. We can conclude that 
the majority of targets for Chinese acquirers are located in Europe. This leads to a few 
questions. Is this concentration caused by geography, culture or institution? This paper also 
lists top 10 target countries with highest frequency of transactions (see Appendix Table 9).  
Number of Firms by Industry 
Industry SIC code range Number of Firms 
Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing 
0100-0999 5 
Mining 1000-1499 40 
Construction 1500-1799 5 
not used 1800-1999 0 
Manufacturing 2000-3999 266 
Transportation, 
Communications, Electric, 
Gas and Sanitary service 
4000-4999 43 
Wholesale Trade 5000-5199 34 
Retail Trade 5200-5999 11 
Finance, Insurance and Real 
Estate 
6000-6799 50 
Services 7000-8999 100 
Public Administration 9100-9729 0 
Nonclassifiable 9900-9999 0 
Total  554 
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3.2 Variables  
3.2.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable used in this study is the share ownership. In prior studies, researchers 
focus on the ownership choice. In other words, researchers tend to divide ownership choices 
into specific categories – minority, majority or full (Contractor et al., 2014). However, this 
paper focuses on the relationship between share ownership and formal institutional distance 
and informal institutional distance. As result, I set share ownership directly as dependent 
variable rather than use categorical variables.  
3.2.2 Independent variables  
The first independent variable is government and judicial system institutional distance. This 
variable measures the government power, ability and freedom differences between the 
nations of home and host countries. This paper uses the most widely used method to indicate 
government and judicial system distance. By estimating utilizing scores of the World Bank’s 
six Governance indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2008)), this paper quantifies 
government and judicial system institutional distance as a score. The governance indicators 
include accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality rule of 
law and corruption control. The composite scores range from -2.50 to +2.50, with higher 
score representing better governance quality (Dikova et al. (2009)). This paper applies 
Euclidean Distance as a methodology to integrate all aspect score into a total score to 














Where  𝐺𝐷𝑎𝑡  = government and judicial system difference between acquirer and target 
nations, 𝐺𝐼𝑖𝑎= acquirer country score on a particular governance indicator, and 𝐺𝐼𝑖𝑡=target 
country score on a particular governance indicator. 
The second variable is the economic distance, which measures the market openness. If we 
include many indicators to express the broad market openness level, it leads to a 
multicollinearity problem. As result, in this section, this paper only includes three indicators 
to express a country’s market freedom. These three indicators include: trade freedom, 
investment freedom and financial freedom. The indicators are collected from 2019 Index of 
Economic Freedom, which is published by Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal 
together. And this paper also uses Euclidean distance methodology to calculate overall score:  
 
Where 𝐸𝐷𝑎𝑡 =economic difference between acquirer and target nations, 𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑎 = acquirer 
country score on a particular economic freedom indicator, and 𝐸𝐷𝑖𝑡= target country score on 
a particular economic freedom indicator. 
The third variable is management distance and it measures the informal institutional distance 
level. This paper applies the widely used method to estimate the average management quality 
of one country（Pan (2008). As Pan (2008) suggests, management quality can be divided 
into six indicators: willingness to delegate authority, reliance on professional management, 
extent of staff training, innovation ecosystem, meritocracy and incentivization and R&D 
expenditure. These indicators are collected by The Global Competitiveness Report 2019. This 
paper also uses Euclidean distance methodology to calculate overall management distance 
score:  
 



















 𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑎 = acquirer country score on a particular management indicator,  
and 𝑀𝐷𝑖𝑡= target country score on a particular management indicator. 
 
3.2.3 Control variables 
This paper uses economic development level, natural resources and the geographic distance 
of the host country as control variables. This paper uses GDP per capita as an indicator of 
current economic development level. In order to avoid extremum effect, I set the logarithm of 
GDP per capita as the control variable. The second control variable is natural resources and it 
can be indicated by export of fuels, ores and metals. The last control variable, the geographic 
distance, can indicate real geographical distance’s effect on mergers and acquisitions. In 
addition, this paper also uses the logarithm of geographic distance to control extremum. 
















Table 4.  
This table provides definitions for all the variables. 
Variable Definition Source 
Dependent 




Government Distance Computation based on 
institutional distance 
measure of Contractor et 
al (2013). 
Difference between China 
and the host country 
across the six governance 
dimensions of Kaufmann 
et al (2009).    
World Bank 
Economic Distance Difference between China 
and the host country 
across the three 
dimensions. 
2019 Index of Economic 
Freedom 
Management Distance Difference between China 
and the host country 
across the six dimensions. 
The global Competitiveness 
Report 2019 
Control 
Export The Natural Resource 
Ownership Status in the 
host country. 
World Bank 
Ln(GDP) Logarithm of the per 
capita gross domestic 
product of the host 
country. 
World Bank 
Ln(GEO) The logarithm of the 
geographical distance 




4. Results and Analysis 
4.1Description and Correlation analysis 
 
Table 5 shows, when Chinese companies enter foreign markets, they acquire on average 
75.39% of the target company. This figure shows that Chinese companies tend to hold a 
higher percentage of ownership. The mean of government distance is 4.30, the standard 
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deviation is 1.12, the mean of economic distance is 58.44, the standard deviation is 9.30, the 
mean of the management distance is 34.64, and the standard deviation is 11.45. These data 
show that the difference of government distance between China and other host countries is 
smaller than the other two distances. In contrast, the management distance is the largest 
between China and the host countries. 
Table 5.  
This table provides descriptive statistics for all the variables. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
share 554 0.00% 100.00% 75.39% 35.26% 
Government 
distance 
554 1.02 6.01 4.30 1.12 
economic distance 554 10.68 71.62 58.44 9.30 
management 
distance 
554 11.41 49.33 34.64 11.45 
export 554 0.99 74.62 16.71 20.42 
Ln(GDP) 554 2.35 9.78 7.67 1.38 
Ln(GEO) 554 8.66 9.87 9.09 0.23 
 
Table 6 provides the correlation matrix. All independent variables and control variables show 












Table 6.  
This table provides correlation matrix. 
Correlations 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.Share 1       
2.Government 
distance 
0.17*** 1      
3.economic 
distance 
 0.02 0.53*** 1     
4.management 
distance 
0.23*** 0.64*** 0.43*** 1    
5.LN(GDP) 0.14*** -0.10** 0.09** 0.33*** 1   
6.export -0.13*** 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.08 1  
7.ln(GEO) 0.12*** -0.14*** -0.49** 0.12*** 0.24*** -0.02 1 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The only exception is economic distance, which shows no significant relationship with the 
dependent variable. This paper will test the variance inflation factor (VIF) in the next section. 
4.2 Regression results analysis 
Table 7.  
This table provides results for the regression analysis (Independent variables are government 






B Std. Error Beta VIF 
1 (Constant) -55.14 89.66   
Government 
distance 6.17** 2.45 0.17 2.63 
Economic distance -0.42** 0.22 -0.11 1.85 
Management 
distance 
0.37* 0.20 0.12 2.44 
Ln(GDP) 2.85** 1.26 0.11 1.44 
Export -0.21** 0.08 -0.115 1.15 
Ln(GEO) 10.69 9.20 0.066 1.85 
 N=554        𝑅2=0.063 
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In Table 7, the highest VIF score is 2.63 which is far less than 10. Therefore, I can conclude 
that there is no multicollinearity issue for all independent variables.   
According to regression results, the coefficient for government distance is 6.17, with the t-
value of 2.52. The government distance has a p-value of less than 0.05. Therefore, I can make 
the following conclusions about the relationship between government distance and share: (1). 
Government distance has a significant effect on the share proportion choice of Chinese 
acquirers. (2). The relationship is positive, which is consistent with my Hypothesis 1. 
The coefficient for economic distance is -0.42, with the t-value of 1.98. It is statistically 
significant at 5% level of significance. This implies: (1). Economic distance has a significant 
effect on the share proportion choice of Chinese acquirers when they choose to acquire 
foreign targets. (2). The relationship is negative, which is consistent with my Hypothesis 2.  
The coefficient for management distance is 0.37, with the t value of 1.81, which is significant 
at 10% level of significance. The relationship between management distance and share 
ownership is not significant as government distance and economic distance. (2). This may be 
caused by the other two distance. However, I use regression analysis to further investigate the 
relationship between the management distance and share with control variables. Table 8 
provides these results.  
Table 8.  
This table provides results for the regression analysis (Independent variables is management 






B Std. Error Beta 





0.63*** 0.13 0.2 
Ln(geo) 12.27* 6.61 0.08 
Ln(GDP) 1.38 1.16 0.05 
export -0.22*** 0.07 -0.13 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The results presented in Table 8 imply that: (1). There exists a significant relationship 
between share ownership and management distance. (2) The relationship is positive, which 
rejects my Hypothesis 2. I suggest one explanation for this result: As the relationship between 
share ownership and management distance is implicit, it is not easily observable. This 
distance will be implied in individual employee, leadership level and corporate culture. The 
proxy used in the regression may contain noise.  
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
This paper is inspired by the contractor et al. (2014) which investigates the effects of 
differences between nations of host countries and home countries on the stock choice at 
institution, industry and culture levels. The difference between this paper and contractor et al. 
(2014) is that the former is more concerned with developed countries as acquirers and this 
paper focuses on the impact of different dimensions of Chinese multinationals in the process 
of entering the foreign market. This paper is also concerned about the effect of institutional 
environment on equity choice, but more specifically, this paper divides broad institutional 
environment along government and economic dimensions. This paper reaches these 
conclusions: When Chinese multinational companies enter a foreign market, the government 
distance brings policy arbitrage opportunity for the Chinese acquirers. In addition, this effect 
leads Chinese multinational companies to choose higher equity portion because Chinese 
companies are confident that this policy arbitrage will bring them better prospects for their 
business operations. This paper compares economic distance and government distance and 
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finds that economic distance unlike government distance, will bring liability of foreignness 
for the Chinese acquirers. This effect makes Chinese multinational companies feel less 
confident in generating synergy with the foreign targets. As a result, Chinese companies tend 
to acquire lower equity proportion in merger and acquisition transactions. 
Compared with government and judicial system distance and economic distance, this paper 
does not find robust results for the management dimension. This paper hypothesizes a 
negative relationship between the management distance and the share choice of Chinese 
acquirers, but eventually finds no significant relationship in the model. This result is 
obviously disappointing. However, this paper tries to propose an appropriate explanation for 
this result: perhaps because the management distance is implied in the foreign market, it is 
not correctly measured.  
There are a number of limitations for this paper: (1). A more precise measure of management 
distance, perhaps at firm level, can provide better insights into the relationship between 
difference in management level between the acquirer and the target firm on Chinese 
companies’ merger and acquisition equity choice. (2). This article does not consider the 
performance post acquisition. Thus, even though the acquisition has taken place, we are not 
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Table 9.  
This table provides frequencies of the top 10 countries in the overall sample. 
Target Country Country Code Frequency 
United states US 96 
Germany DE 81 
United Kingdom GB 55 
Italy IT 52 
Australia AU 44 
France FR 26 
Russia RU 19 
Canada CA 18 
Netherlands NL 18 
Brazil BR 16 
Spain ES 16 




Table 10.  
This table provides result for the regression analysis. Standard errors clustered by years. 
Variables are as defined in Table 4. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Share Share Share Share 
     
Government Distance 0.080***    
 (0.021)    
Log GDP 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.039** 0.048*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.015) 
Log Geo Distance 0.210** 0.157 0.183* 0.111 
 (0.105) (0.105) (0.106) (0.104) 
Economic Distance  0.004**   
  (0.002)   
Management Distance   0.005*  
   (0.003)  
Culture Distance    -0.002 
    (0.001) 
Constant -1.940** -1.326 -1.556 -0.567 
 (0.943) (0.938) (0.971) (0.905) 
     
Observations 424 424 424 424 
R-squared 0.381 0.363 0.388 0.357 
Standard errors in parentheses 
























Table 11.  
This table provides result for the regression analysis. Standard errors clustered by years and 
industries. Variables are as defined in Table 4. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Share Share Share Share 
     
Government Distance 0.063**    
 (0.023)    
Log GDP 0.035*** 0.031** 0.027* 0.027* 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013) 
Log Geo Distance 0.171 0.146 0.153 0.108 
 (0.101) (0.098) (0.097) (0.089) 
Economic Distance  0.003**   
  (0.001)   
Management Distance   0.003  
   (0.002)  
Culture Distance    -0.003** 
    (0.001) 
Constant -1.341 -0.997 -1.112 -0.349 
 (0.966) (0.897) (0.924) (0.746) 
     
Observations 554 554 554 554 
R-squared 0.067 0.042 0.071 0.047 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
